Saving Lives Based on Human Factors Anchored On R&D Part 1
In several of these articles we have made the point that Survival Systems Limited’s (SSL)ability to trade and succeed is based on effective R&D coupled with manufacturing and customer service excellence.
Being a small Canadian company with a worldwide reach into a largely unregulated market demands that you have to have something that stands you apart from the competitors.
From its inception SSL’s founder and then its, now, current owner have adopted this three pronged approach to doing business recognising the value of independent R&D and emphasising and commissioning additional R&D because the three elements feed off each other. The more R&D you undertake and implement the better the equipment is. This in turn allows you to excel at customer and product support and gain more user feedback which generates more R&D. In simple terms it’s a lifesaving loop of applying science and ingenuity whilst continuing to gain the information from thought, study and user feedback to generate more focused science and R&D.
The R&D comes from 4 sources internal, external and then two renowned academics and consultants. Being on top of the external R&D is essential and the internal resources and the two external consultants are key to this. They also drive a lot if not most of the innovation and thinking behind the excellence of Survival Systems Limited’s lifesaving products and training.
SSL’s philosophy of “Creating A Standard” has had profound influence in improving training technologies, personnel protective equipment, and training programs. Two renowned consultants executing the underlying R&D have been Dr Chris Brooks and Michael Taber PhD. Together in addition to applying their own encyclopaedic knowledge and experience they have launched several practical R&D activities, testing their, our, and others’ theories, examining proposals and making sure designs are fully tested before becoming available to the customers and clients. In short R&D makes sure the visions of the future become the art of the possible in saving lives. That lifesaving R&D can be equipment, training or physiologically orientated: the R&D covers them all as does SSL’s products and services.
Chris who has sadly died is remembered for being a Tsunami of knowledge, experience and common sense, a hugely experienced and knowledgeable flight surgeon and aviation medicine consultant rooted in the reality of flying, and yes flight accidents and disasters. Understanding the reasons for death and injury and crucially survival, working out what caused them, how to prevent them and identifying and explaining the lessons of survival and fatalities. A link to a detailed and fulsome obituary is below and a subsequent article will cover more of his activities and achievements.
https://www.legacy.com/ca/obituaries/theglobeandmail/name/christopher-brooks-obituary?id=56514603
Mike continues his R&D work informing lobbying: for more effective regulation, improved (more and better) training and greater understanding of the equipment and physiological issues. He is editor of Handbook of Offshore Helicopter Transport Safety: Essentials of Underwater Egress and Survival and an example of his work which illustrates the thinking and thought processes that SSL benefit from is below. His scientific paper publishing on the subject is prolific and his membership of scientific, legal and practical bodies considerable. We are working on a new project, the results of which one day will reinforce prior revelations that retention training in required in the pursuit of enhancing and preserving workers’ lives.
Retention of helicopter underwater egress training (HUET) skills: How long do we remember the critical tasks?
Michael J Taber, PhD
VP Research and Development
N2M Consulting Inc.
Without question, helicopter underwater egress training (HUET) has saved countless lives in real-world events. This fact is noted by governmental accident investigation agencies around the world (National transportation Safety Board, Transport Canada, European Union Aviation Safety Agency, Australian Transport Safety Bureau, and the Civil Aviation Authority, to mention a few). But how long do crew and passengers remember the critical tasks needed to successfully egress a capsized and flooded helicopter? Surprisingly, very little research has explored that specific question.
Despite mandated HUET program requirements for military and civilian personnel, only four known research studies have empirically examined performance of HUET skills beyond the competency assessment which occurs during training. One of the first reported studies to examine HUET retention was completed by Summers (1996) for the Industrial Foundation of Accident Prevention (IFAP). The study was designed to specifically answer the question of whether it could be expected that employees would be competent in helicopter underwater escape given the training schedule that was in use at the time (2-year renewal). After testing 174 offshore workers on a HUET declarative questionnaire, Summers (1996) noted that skill decay occurred across all participants regardless of the number of times they had completed the training in the past. It was further noted that the 2-year retraining schedule was insufficient in ensuring that the offshore workforce would be fully prepared to remember the steps needed in the event of a ditching which resulted in a capsize of the helicopter. Mills and Muir (1999) performed the first known HUET practical skills retention test to examine the demonstration of procedural underwater egress tasks on offshore workers at six months, one year, 18 months, two years, three years, and four years after their most recently completed HUET course. In the Mills and Muir (1999) study, it was found that after only six months, some individuals were unable to meet basic minimum criterion needed to successfully egress the training simulator. It was further identified that more than a third of the 52 people, who volunteered to take part in the study, failed to egress unassisted and that those who had several training courses performed no better than those who had only one previous HUET course. Similarly, Kozey, McCabe, and Jenkins (2007) indicated that nearly 50% of individuals who had not been given the opportunity to jettison an emergency exit underwater during initial practical HUET skill demonstrations failed to perform the necessary tasks after a retention period of six months. Finally, Taber, Kozey, and McCabe (2012) clearly demonstrated that after training volunteers in four different HUET methods, the results showed that without having the chance to practice the use of emergency breathing systems during initial HUET, it was significantly more likely that the person would attempt to egress without it and required more assistance from training staff. These results, taken together with anecdotal evidence, suggest that current HUET programs for offshore workers may not be sufficient to prepare them for a real-world event. Interestingly, no known HUET retention studies have been carried out with military personnel.
Skill acquisition and transfer to the real-world are only part of the HUET process. One of the primary aspects associated with this training is the ability to recall the steps necessary to complete the complex tasks during egress. The steps (discrete motor responses) need to be performed in a precise order and, during a real-world event, are often completed in conditions that are less than desirable (e.g., cold water, low light, reduced visibility, limited time related to breath-hold capabilities, inverted, multiple snagging possibilities) and possibly after being injured.
Real-world events have shown that procedural skills which are not practiced on a regular basis are particularly susceptible to forgetting. As an example, the Australian Transportation Safety Board (2022) concluded the following:
The operator rostered the pilot under supervision for MPT flying without ensuring that helicopter underwater escape training (HUET)
had been completed in accordance with the operations manual. Although the pilot under supervision had completed HUET in 2009 and 2011, the lack of recency reduced their preparedness for escaping the helicopter following submersion (p. ii).
Similarly, the Canadian Forces Flight Safety Report (2008a) noted that although the crew members of the CH124 (Sea King) ditching were able to egress, they all reported:
escape actions diverged by some degree from established, and taught, egress procedures. One of the crewmembers accidentally unfastened his backpack while intending to undo his lap belt. Two aircrew undid their lap belts before the aircraft’s motion ceased. Both pilots and the TACCO had difficulty locating and utilizing escape hatch handles. One of the crew could not locate the activation lanyard for his life raft (p. 31/39).
Retention of complex skill sets, and the integration of new information / equipment is also discussed in a CH149 (Cormorant) Canadian Forces Flight Safety Report (2008b). In the report it is noted that because one of the crew members was not current in underwater egress training, the member had never been formally trained in the use of emergency breathing; therefore, it was not part of their egress plan.
HUET skills are only ever practiced during training as it is not currently possible to complete the full egress process on a real helicopter and at present, no known “dry” simulator exists at local heliports. Therefore, the limited practice of complex set of skills associated with an egress from an inverted flooded helicopter creates a situation in which personnel are unlikely to remember every step in the correct sequence. Major aspects of the egress will likely be recalled (e.g., jettison the exit, undo seat harness); however, the finer details of exactly how and in what order to accomplish each task are more difficult to remember over time.
Despite the known challenges associated with egressing from a flooded and capsized helicopter, little empirical research has specifically explored the different training methodologies used to prepare personnel for performance of the skills in a training environment and even less has considered the retention / performance of those skills beyond the initial certification process. Taber (2016) suggests that one of the main issues related to retention is the fact that individuals are trained to complete the HUET skills and immediately tested without a consolidation period or a requirement to demonstrate a whole-task performance which can be evaluated for retention (see also Taber, Kozey, & McCabe, 2012; Taber & McGarr, 2013). Specifically, Taber (2014) writes, “There is no time allowed for consolidation of information (typically 24 h) (Walker et al., 2003), nor is there a requirement for delayed recall skill demonstration. Worse yet, individuals in the offshore are not retested for at least three years. In fact, in some offshore jurisdictions individuals do not need to demonstrate their ability to perform underwater escape tasks for a period of 48 months” (p. 273). From a military / para-military perspective the Royal Canadian Air Force HUET program ranges between 2 to 10 years depending on operational roles, the US Coast Guard requires training once every 6.25 years, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police train every 5 years. It should be noted that none of these training / retraining schedules have been empirically tested and are not supported by any specific research findings.
Although HUET programs have been around for more than half a century, it is currently not possible to answer one of the most basic questions regarding the efficacy of the training. How long will we remember what to do in a ditching? Until focused HUET skill retention research is completed for the various operational roles and the associated fidelity of training, the answer may not be as long as we hope it to be.
References
Australian Transportation Safety Board (ATSB) (2022). Collision with water involving EC135 P2+ helicopter, VH-ZGA. Report AO-2018-022.
Canadian Forces Flight Safety Investigation Report (FSIR) (2008a). File number 1010-12438 (DFS 2-2).
Canadian Forces Flight Safety Investigation Report (FSIR) (2008b). File number 1010-149914 (DFS 2-3).
Kozey J., McCabe, J., & Jenkins, J. (2007). The effects of different training methods on egress performance from the Modular Egress Training Simulator. Safe Conference Proceedings.
Mills, A. & Muir, H. (1999) Executive summary report: Development of a training standard for underwater survival. Cranfield University research report commissioned by Shell.
Summers, F. (1996). Procedural skill decay and optimal retraining periods for helicopter underwater escape training. Technical report for Industrial Foundation for Accident Prevention (IFAP Survival Training Centre). ISBN 1875966021
Taber, M.J. (2014). Simulator fidelity and contextual interference in helicopter underwater egress training: An analysis of training and retention of egress skills. Safety Science, 62, 271–278.
Taber, M.J., Kozey, J. & McCabe, J. (2012). Investigation of emergency breathing apparatus skill set knowledge transfer between helicopter underwater escape training simulators. Unpublished technical document for Survival Systems Training Limited.
Taber, M. J., & McGarr, G. W. (2013). Confidence in future helicopter underwater egress performance: an examination of training standards. Safety Science, 60, 169-175.
The benefits of bringing external thinking to SSL are numerous: the first is not an obvious one in that it challenges SSL’s thought processes. A second is that it brings thoughts and ideas from other areas to SSL. This helps the internal thought processes and procedures in many ways. We all benefit in at least two major areas by having R&D challenge us; we have a clearer understanding of our thinking and are helped to find, understand and then exceed best practice.
However, there are other benefits. SSL believes in not just being part of the community but of trying to help lead it. Sharing our R&D is part of this. Convincing people of the safety and operational benefits of flight and egress safety has to be the right thing to do. Bringing forward thinking of the benefits of effective training to operators and users has to be beneficial. In this a common hymn sheet helps.
Flight safety (and safety of operators and users of other vessels that venture close to or into or above the water) has an impact on operations. For the military the loss of a vessel or aircraft and crew will adversely impact the operational plan and future force capability. You would not deliberately move into effective enemy fire if you could avoid it, so why do the enemy’s job for them by not husbanding your assets? From a civilian perspective failure to apply it effectively has an adverse effect on future business and profit and loss. In both cases it is people’s lives and those of their family that you are playing fast and loose with. We expect the operating crew of an aircraft or vehicle or boat to be adequately trained and undergo refresher training especially in hazardous environments. Why not the passengers?
Paying little heed to calls for reasonably thought through mandatory training, including refresher training, for passengers in hazardous environments, for example, should be resisted. Turning blind eyes and deaf ears to ideas for training which can change casualties into survivors is non sensical. It simply turns situations which can be fraught with danger into a race to the bottom, literally. SSL’s modus operandi is Enhance and Preserve Life through a three-pronged approach of safety education, training technologies, and applied research and development and Messrs. Brooks’ and Taber’s industry dedication continues to help SSL provide leadership to the industry and the sector.
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